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COMMENT
WHAT'S THE BIG IDEA BEHIND THE IDEA-
EXPRESSION DICHOTOMY?-MODERN
RAMIFICATIONS OF THE TREE OF PORPHYRY
IN COPYRIGHT LAW*
AMAURY CRUZ
Between the idea
and the reality
Between the motion
and the Act
Falls the Shadow
-T.S. Eliot
A N AXIOM of copyright law is that only the expression of ideas,
not the ideas themselves, are copyrightable. 1 The Copyright Act
of 1976 codifies this axiom by explicitly denying protection to "any
idea. ' 2 The subject matters of copyright properly include "original
works of authorship," which include literary, musical, and dramatic
works; pantomimes and choreographic works; pictorial, graphic, and
* This paper has been submitted to the Nathan Burkan Memorial Competition sponsored
by the American Society of Composers, Authors, and Publishers (ASCAP).
1. E.g., Data East USA, Inc. v. Epyx, Inc., 862 F.2d 204, 207 (9th Cir. 1988).
2. The Copyright Act of 1976 provides that:
In no case does copyright protection for an original work of authorship extend to any
idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or discov-
ery, regardless of the form in which it is described, explained, illustrated, or embodied
in such work.
17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1988). Ideas, however, may be protected under state laws relating to con-
tracts, quasi-contracts, and quantum meruit, as well as fraud, unfair competition, and misrepre-
sentation, provided these laws are not preempted by the Copyright Act. See, e.g., Stillman v.
Leo Burnett Co., 720 F. Supp. 1353 (N.D. Ill. 1989); Nimmer, The Law of Ideas, 27 S. CAL. L.
REV. 119 (1954); Note, Beyond the Realm of Copyright: Is There Legal Sanctuary For the Mer-
chant of Ideas?, 41 BROOKLYN L. REV. 284 (1974).
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sculptural works; motion pictures and other audiovisual works; and
sound recordings.3
Ideas, then, are as "free as air," ' 4 but original works of authorship
are copyrightable. The "works of authorship" concept, however, did
not appear in the copyright statute until 1976. 5 Historically, the courts
have attempted to limit the scope of protection by invoking the some-
times-criticized idea-expression dichotomy. 6 Therefore, the court's
definition of an "idea," as opposed to an "expression," can deter-
mine the outcome of a case. But the Copyright Act of 1976 offers no
guidance in deciding what is an idea, resulting in jurisprudential un-
certainty. 7 Such uncertainty arises because of the difficulties in grasp-
ing the nature of "ideas," a subject that has confounded generations
of philosophers and legal scholars.8
This Comment will attempt to elucidate the doctrine of the idea-
expression dichotomy and support the proposition that the dichotomy
is still useful in the resolution of copyright issues, although the courts
must be careful in the application of the doctrine to produce coherent
decisions. This Comment does not purport to provide the ultimate
definition of an idea, but only to expose an angle of a subject befit-
3. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1988).
4. Fendler v. Morosco, 253 N.Y. 281, 171 N.E. 56 (1930). The thought that ideas are
communal property was first recorded in Seneca's Epistles during the first century A.D. Nim-
mer, supra note 2, at 119.
5. The Copyright Act of 1909, echoing the constitutional grant to "Authors and Inven-
tors" of a monopoly to their "Writings and Discoveries," U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 8, referred
to "all the writings of an author." 17 U.S.C. § 4 (1952). Congress modified the language in 1976
partly "to eliminate the uncertainties" resulting from the phrase "writings of an author." H.R.
Rep. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 51 (reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS
5659, 5664). The uncertainties resulted from the possibility of regarding the 1909 Act as identical
to the constitutional grant, thus making every copyright decision a question of constitutional
interpretation as to whether any new form of expression qualified for protection. Id.
6. See, e.g., Umbreit, A Consideration of Copyright, 87 U. PA. L. REV. 932 (1939) (the
doctrine fails to describe the cases and is a "truism"); Yen, A First Amendment Perspective on
the Idea/Expression Dichotomy and Copyright in a Work's "Total Concept and Feel," 38
EMORY L.J. 393 (1989) (the doctrine is inadequate as presently used; "idea" is nowhere defined;
copyright law is exceeding constitutional bounds); but see, e.g., Warner Bros., Inc. v. American
Broadcasting Co., 720 F.2d 231, 240 (2d Cir. 1983) ("Though imprecise, [the idea-expression
dichotomy] remains a useful analytic tool for separating infringing from non-infringing works
.... "); R. BROWN & R. DENICOLA, CASES ON COPYRIGHT, UNFAIR COMPETITION, AND OTHER
Topics BEARING ON THE PROTECTION OF LITERARY, MUSICAL, AND ARTISTIC WORKS 256 n.6
(1990) ("We have surveyed the literature and have found that no better formulation has been
devised."); Hughes, The Philosophy of Intellectual Property, 77 GEo. L.J. 287 (1988) (the di-
chotomy is a way to accommodate the competing interests of the first amendment and the copy-
right clause).
7. Yen, supra note 6, at 396-97.
8. Other key copyright terms can be manipulated through semantic and legal arguments,
but none is more elusive than the term "idea."
IDEA - EXPRESSION
ting the character of copyright (and patent) law as the legal field that
is closest to the metaphysics of jurisprudence. 9
I. PHILOLOGICAL AND ETYMOLOGICAL ROOTS
The word "idea" may be commonplace, but is rarely used with a
clear sense of its connotations. The definition of "idea" in Oxford's
unabridged dictionary takes a full page containing over 4000 words10
relating to twelve principal "acceptations" 1' and numerous subcatego-
ries. Its first acceptation is "general or ideal form as distinguished
from its realization in individuals; archetype, pattern, plan, stan-
dard."' 2 This is one of the two most significant acceptations for pur-
poses of our discussion; the other is "mental image, conception,
notion,"' 3 which is perhaps most closely associated in the popular
mind with the thought processes preceding the making of a "work"
by an inventor, artist, or creator.
Terms such as "notion," "concept," "conception," "model," and
"ideal" are related to "idea" but differ in their connotations. "Idea"
is the most comprehensive of the terms relating to the "representation
of something . . . or as a formulation of an opinion, a plan, or a
design.''114 "Concept" sounds in logic and describes the synthesis of
diverse objects through their common elements, allowing abstract un-
derstanding, as in, for example, "the concept of a 'horse,' 'table,'
[or] 'mountain.' ",15 More generally, "concept" also suggests an aspir-
ational model. For example, "we find among the Greeks germinal
concepts which are a vital part of modern thought.' ' 6 "Conception"
is similar to "concept," but implies the intent to reserve the term
"concept" for an application in logic' 7 and refers especially to "the
beginning of some process, chain of events, etc.' ' 8 The term "no-
9. See Folsom v. Marsh, 9 Fed. Cas. 342, 344 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4901) (Story, J.).
Generally, scholarly pieces treat this subject only tangentially and in relation to narrower copy-
right issues. The goal of this Comment is to consider the whole picture.
10. 1 THE COMPACT EDITION OF THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 1367 (1975) [hereinafter
OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY].
11. "The generally accepted meaning (of a word or expression)." WEBSTER'S NEW WORLD
DICTIONARY 8 (1979).
12. OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, supra note 10, at 1367.
13. Id.
14. WEBSTER'S NEW DICTIONARY OF SYNONYMs 411 (1973).
15. Id.; see also T. BERNSTEIN, THE CAREFUL WRITER, A MODERN GUIDE TO ENGLISH US-
AGE 113 (1972) (criticizing the tendency "to make the lesser seem the greater and to enfold the
commonplace in the mantle of science or philosophy that has a debasing effect on the word
concept" and explaining that a concept is essentially a general idea derived from particulars).
16. WEBSTER'S NEW DICTIONARY OF SYNONYMS 411 (1973).
17. Id.
18. WEBSTER'S NEW WORLD DICTIONARY 293 (1979).
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tion" suggests not only vagueness but also whimsical or uncertain ap-
perceptions of actual reality.' 9 As a noun, the term "ideal" is akin to
model or exemplar. 20 As an adjective, the term "ideal" is analogous
to Utopian, 2' suggesting once again the influence of Realistic Greek
philosophy. 22 The etymology of "idea," in fact, goes back to the
Greek word "idaea, ' 23 whose root meaning is equivalent to "beheld"
or "seen" and is conceptually related to the Latin term "species,"
from which the words specere and hence "spectator" are derived. 24
II. BRANCHES OF PHILOSOPHICAL DICHOTOMIES
Dichotomies are fundamental in practically every philosophical and
religious system, from Manichaeism 25 to Christianity, 26 and from
Confucianism 27 to Existentialism.2" Thought processes themselves may
follow dichotomous patterns because of the structure and evolution of
the human brain. 29 In the field of jurisprudence, one influential com-
mentator argued that judicial canons of statutory interpretation al-
ways seem to come in pairs,30 a phenomenon reminiscent of Newton's
third law of motion that "for every action there is an equal and oppo-
site reaction."'" Other important-and troublesome-dualities are
19. WEBSTER'S NEW DICTIONARY OF SYNONYMS 411 (1973).
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. See, e.g., T. MORE, THE UTOPIA (1516).
23. Also transliterated from the Greek as ideae or ideai.
24. OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, supra note 10, at 1367. The metaphor of "seeing" is
prevalent in both fiction and philosophy with respect to perceiving eternal truths, the essence of
being, God, salvation, Nirvana, and even the "luminous essence" of human beings. See, e.g., C.
CASTANEDA, THE EAGLE'S GIFT (1981); PLATO, Republic, in TIE COLLECTED DIALOGUES OF PLATO
575 (Bollingen Series LXXI 1961) (metaphor of humans trapped in a cave and, unable to see the
light, confusing reality with the shadows).
25. A religious philosophy taught by the Persian Mani and his disciples from the third to
the seventh century A.D. and based on the competition between the principles of the Good
(Light) and Darkness (Evil). KNOWLEDGE AND VALUE, INTRODUCTORY READINGS IN PnI.osopH-
437 (E. Sprague & P. Taylor ed. 1959).
26. Heaven and Hell, Body and Soul, God and Satan, etc.
27. For an explanation of the principles of Yin and Yang, equivalent to positive and nega-
tive, male and female, day and night, good and evil, and other dichotomies said to underlie the
essence of reality in oriental philosophy, see, e.g., THE I CHING OR BOOK OF CHANGES (Bollingen
Series XIX 1967) believed to be the first book ever written and the source of both Confucianism
and Taoism.
28. See generally, SARTRE, BEING AND NOTHINGNESS (1966).
29. Cf., J. JAYNES, THE ORIGIN OF CONSCIOUSNESS IN THE BREAKDOWN OF THE BICAMERAL
MND (1976) (arguing that human beings were not "conscious" but rather driven by visions and
voices until as recently as 5000 years ago, when the two hemispheres of the brain began to oper-
ate as a single unit as a result of adaptational forces).
30. Llewelyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules or Canons
About How Statutes Are to Be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REv. 395 (1950).
31. I. NEWTON, PHunosoPHiAE NATURALIS PRINCIPIA MATHEMATICA (1686).
IDEA - EXPRESSION
those of law-fact and substance-procedure. The poles of these juris-
prudential dichotomies meet at an indeterminate, shadowy area, al-
lowing judges the opportunity to rationalize decisions that may be
based actually on "gut feeling," personal biases, or inchoate mental
processes.
It is beyond the scope of this Comment to analyze in any detail the
philosophical implications of the notion of dichotomy throughout the
ages. It is helpful, however, to preface the discussion of the related
legal issues with a cursory exposition of certain seminal ideas of West-
ern philosophy.32
A. Plato's Theory of Ideas
The concept of "ideas" was introduced in Western philosophy
through Plato's dialogues.33 From a linguistic point of view, Plato's
dialogues represent an attempt to explain the significance of common
nouns, which play a special role by grouping diverse things instead of
differentiating a specific thing from other similar things.3 4 In other
words, a number of things share common characteristics in our minds
because of our ability to abstract properties or qualities from sensible
objects, placing those properties outside any spatiotemporal loca-
tion.35 The classic explanation for this concept speaks of geometrical
forms such as the triangle.36 The triangle we can draw and see on pa-
per is said to be merely an approximation of the "real" triangle de-
fined by the abstract rules of geometry, "a plane figure bounded by
three straight lines," because perfectly straight lines and perfect
planes are beyond human perception. 7
Plato, therefore, contended that ideas, unlike objects, cannot exist
in time or space; they are rather "eternal" or "timeless." 38 Ideas must
be apprehended not through our senses but rather through a process
of reflection, creating a gap between the Intelligible World and the
Sensible World.3 9 This gap parallels the distinction between ideas and
32. Many ancient Greek ideas seem to be "ideal ideas" and reverberate through the centu-
ries. For an "insider's" view of the professional rivalries between Platonists and Peripatetics at '-
the University of Chicago in recent times, see R. PIRSIG, ZEN AND THE ART OF MOTORCYCLE
MAINTENANCE (1974).
33. 2 DICTIONARY OF THE HISTORY OF IDEAS, STUDIES OF SELECTED PIVOTAL IDEAS 542 (P.P.
Wiener ed. 1973) [hereinafter HISTORY OF IDEAS].
34. Id. The adjectives applied to common nouns serve the same function. Id.
35. See id.
36. See PLATO, Meno, in THE COLLECTED DIALOGUES OF PLATO 353 (Bollingeh Series LXXI
1961).
37. HISTORY OF IDEAS 542.
38. Id.
39. Id.
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expressions. According to Plato, people are born into the world with a
stock of preexisting ideas of which they retain but a dim memory and
of which they may be reminded by experience and other methods.40 In
sum, Plato's ideas can be defined as timeless universal constructs that
exist only in the mind. 4' This conception is consistent with the intellec-
tual property theory that ideas are free as air-that no one should
claim ownership in what one has not created but rather belongs to our
common intellectual patrimony.42
B. Aristotle's Bough
Aristotle preferred to use the word eidos, perhaps because he disa-
greed with Plato's theory of ideas and he wanted to fill the gap be-
tween the Intelligible and the Sensible worlds. 43 Although both idaea
and eidos are derived from the Greek word "to see," the latter is re-
lated to and generally translated by the English word "form," which
is the object of the seeing implied by the verb.4 This nuance of mean-
ing better fit Aristotle's view that Justice, for example, does not exist
in the abstract but only in the acts of just people, and that an idea, 45
though common property, "might be a form in the sense of the pat-
tern that processes exemplify . . . or the shape of finished works of
art."46 Thus, Aristotle's metaphors, derived essentially from the visual
arts and biology, spoke of the potentialities of forms, to be. realized in
their end product. 47 The form of a chicken, for example, was actual in
the living animal and potentially present in the egg. 48 In the case of
sculptures or paintings, the forms of the works of art exist in the
minds of the artists before being actualized, and only as a potential
inside the marble or the paint; the sculpting or painting then reveals
the intelligible form as the sensible, final cause of a process.4 9
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. For a discussion of ideas and the "Common" in the Lockean sense, see Hughes, The
Philosophy of Intellectual Property, 77 GEO. L.J. 287, 315 (1988) (rejecting the proposition that,
because ideas can be used by everyone, whereas physical property can only be used by one entity
at a time, there should be no intellectual property).
43. HISTORY OF IDEAS, supra note 33, at 543.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 544. For a full discussion, see ARISTOTLE, Politica, THE BASIC WORKS OF ARISTO-
TLE 1127-1316 (McKeon ed. 1966).
46. HISTORY OF IDEAS, supra note 33, at 544.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id. While "efficient causes" are the equivalent of proximate causes in the legal context,
final causes are equivalent to "ultimate purpose." See ARISTOTLE, supra note 45, at xviii (Mc-
Keon ed. 1966). Efficient and final causes imply thinking along linear patterns. Cf. THE I CHING
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Although both Plato and Aristotle were concerned with the prob-
lem of abstract qualities, in essence Plato's approach is inductive; Ar-
istotle's, deductive. This difference in itself represents perhaps the
most significant dichotomy in Western thought, leading some com-
mentators to assert that intellectual history after Plato and Aristotle is
but a series of footnotes on these two thinkers. 0 However, Aristotle's
conception of potentialities and the deductive method, rather than
Plato's metaphysical view of ideas, are the principles that appear use-
ful in the legal analysis of the idea-expression dichotomy.
C. The Tree of Porphyry
The Alexandrian philosopher Plotinus, who wanted to harmonize
Plato with Aristotle, contributed to the philosophy of ideas by postu-
lating a hierarchy consisting of the "most real," "most general,"
"best," and "most beautiful" at the pinnacle and the "most particu-
lar," "worst," "unreal," and "ugliest" at the base." Plotinus's pu-
pil, Porphyry, later modified this hierarchy in a way that eventually
became standard fare in introductory courses in philosophy. 2 Called
the "Tree of Porphyry," the hierarchy began with Substance or Be-
ing, divided into Corporeal and Incorporeal; Corporeal was divided
into Animate and Inanimate; Animate, into Sensible and Insensible;
Sensible, into Rational and Irrational; and Rational, into thinking in-
dividuals. 3 Classes were subdivided, appropriately enough, by an ana-
lytical technique called dichotomia, "but neither Porphyry nor
anyone else ever explained where one was to cut a class in two." '5 4 The
metaphor of the tree summarizes the process of abstraction that has
preoccupied philosophers and logicians from Plato to the present.
III. THE FOREST OF DICHOTOMY
Linguistic and philosophical distinctions are only a starting point in
understanding the role of the idea-expression dichotomy in copyright
OR BOOK OF CHANGES xxi-xxxix (Bollingen Series XIX 1967) (foreword by Carl Jung explaining
Chinese thinking along synchronous patterns and perceiving time as a slice of a point-instant, as
opposed to the Western concept of causality implying a domino-type of effect through points in
time). For a full explanation of the theory of the "point instant" in Buddhist epistemology, see
generally ) I. STCHERBATSKY, BUDDHIST LOGIC (1962). Although the artist may not be a "plan-
ner" with a preconceived design, as in the case of the Romantics, the process of creation brings
out even unconscious forms.
50. See, e.g., ARISTOTLE, supra note 45.
51. HISTORY OF IDEAS, supra note 33, at 545.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id.
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law. The contrast between patents and copyrights on the one hand
and, on the other, the inherent constitutional conflict between copy-
right and the first amendment are two of the major elements underly-
ing the legal issues.
A. Contrast Between Patents and Copyrights
In the landmark case of Mazer v. Stein,5" the plaintiffs owned the
copyright for statuettes of male and female dancing figurines that had
been incorporated by the respondents into the bases of table lamps.16
The petitioners in Mazer challenged the validity of the copyright in the
statuettes because they were mass-produced, "utilitarian objects. '5 7
The Court, however, summarized the gradual enlargement of copy-
right in the 1790,58 1870,19 and 190960 copyright acts and found signifi-
cant that the distinctions between aesthetic and useful works in the
1870 act were erased in 1909.61 In finding for the plaintiffs, the Court
further reasoned that "[u]nlike a patent, a copyright gives no exclu-
sive right to the art disclosed; protection is given only to the expres-
sion of the idea-not the idea itself."' 62 Consequently, anyone could
produce statuettes of human figures-or even the Balinese dancers de-
picted in the table lamp. No one, however, could copy the original
statuette, whether or not incorporated into lamps. 63
The Court underscored an important distinction between two areas
of intellectual property: "The dichotomy of protection for the aes-
thetic is not beauty and utility but art for the copyright and the inven-
tion of original and ornamental designs for design patents." 64 Thus,
an inexpensive statue embodying a common idea may be copyrighted,
but subsequent makers of statues may also copyright their "art"; they
would be prohibited only from "copying the copy."65 To obtain ex-
clusive rights, the statue manufacturer would have to meet the stricter
55. 347 U.S. 201 (1954).
56. Id. at 202.
57. Id. at 205. "Their brief accept[ed] the copyrightability of the great carved golden salt
cellar of Cellini but addled]: 'If, however, Cellini designed and manufactured this item in quan-
tity so that the general public could have salt cellars, then an entirely different conclusion would
be reached."' Id.
58. Copyright Act of 1790, c. 15, 1 Stat. 124.
59. Copyright Act of 1870, c. 230, §§85-110, 16 Stat. 198.
60. Copyright Act of 1909, c. 320, 35 Stat. 1075.
61. Mazer, 347 U.S. at 210-11.
62. Id. at 217.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 218.
65. For a discussion of Justice Holmes's proscription against "copying the copy," see infra
text accompanying notes 105-109.
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requirement of a patent: discovery or invention of a new and useful
process or product 66 that is non-obvious.67
The Mazer court further explained the economic philosophy of the
copyright and patent clause:
[Elncouragment of individual effort by personal gain is the best way
to advance public welfare through the talents of authors and
inventors in "Science and useful Arts." Sacrificial days devoted to
such creative activities deserve rewards commensurate with the
services rendered. 68
To maintain the distinction between patents and copyrights in the
light of the expansion of copyright, however, the courts apply differ-
ent standards of originality to the art disclosed. 69 An exclusive right to
an invention or discovery is subject to examination by the Patent Of-
fice, 70 and anyone applying for a patent must "make an oath that he
believes himself to be the original and first inventor of the process,
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter ... ."71 In the con-
text of copyright, "original" only means that the work originates with
the author, so that "[n]o large measure of novelty is necessary. '72
This prohibition amounts to "little more than a prohibition of actual
copying" by the defendant. 73 Therefore, a plurality of valid copyrights
can coexist even in identical works, if made independently without ac-
tual copying74 and by meeting very simple procedural formalities that
are essentially self-executing .7  In sum, compared to a patent, it is rel-
atively easy to obtain a copyright.
66. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1982).
67. Id. § 103.
68. Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954).
69. See Alfred Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts, Inc., 191 F.2d 99, 101-02 (2d Cir. 1951).
70. Id. at 102. Such examination is subject to the following rule:
A patent may not be obtained ... if the differences between the subject matter sought
to be patented and the prior art are such that the subject matter as a whole would have
been obvious at the time the invention was made.
35 U.S.C. § 103 (1982). Cf. Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1 (1966) (explaining the addi-
tion of the test of non-obviousness, besides novelty and utility, to the 1952 patent statute).
71. 35 U.S.C. § 115 (1982) (emphasis added).
72. Catalda, 191 F.2d at 102.
73. Id. at 103 (citing Hoague-Sprague Corp. v. Frank C. Meyer Co., 31 F.2d 583, 586
(D.C.N.Y. 1929)).
74. Id.
75. An author is protected by copyright simply by fixing the work in a tangible medium of
expression. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1988). Failure to meet requirements such as registration and
deposit is not fatal to a case, see id. § 408(a), although such failure can have adverse conse-
quences. Id. § 411(a).
1990]
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A common illustration of the concept of originality is that an inde-
pendent re-creation of the "Romeo and Juliet" story can be copy-
righted as long as the playwright does not copy it from Shakespeare;
but that copyright cannot prevent other playwrights from similarly re-
creating Shakespeare's original, as in the Broadway play "West Side
Story," because it is in the public domain-in the realm of free
ideas. 76 The idea-expression dichotomy is the concept supporting this
illustration.
B. The First Amendment v. Copyright
The apparent contradiction between the freedom of speech guaran-
teed by the first amendment 77 and the copyright clause, 78 which limits
such freedom, creates a unique constitutional conflict. Eminent scho-
lars such as Melville Nimmer and Paul Goldstein, however, maintain
that copyright law actually encourages speech by limiting the duration
of the monopoly granted to authors. 79 This argument has determined
the course of copyright jurisprudence.80 The courts employ it to down-
play first amendment concerns, invoking the idea-expression dichot-
omy as the most important vehicle to limit the expansion of
copyright. 8' The underlying theory is that protecting expressions, but
not ideas, prohibits only speech that is constitutionally inconsequen-
tial.12 Because copyright presumably forbids only the literal repetition
of what others have expressed, it does not detract from "the market-
place of ideas." ' 83 On the other hand, copyright rewards authors who
contribute to the marketplace of ideas by granting them exclusive
rights .84
76. See, e.g., Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 122 (2d Cir. 1930), cert.
denied, 282 U.S. 902 (1931).
77. U.S. CONST. amend I.
78. U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
79. Yen, supra note 6, at 394 (citing Nimmer, Does Copyright Abridge First Amendment
Guarantees of Free Speech and Press?, 17 UCLA L. REV. 1180 (1970); Goldstein, Copyright and
the First Amendment, 70 COLUM. L. REV. 983 (1970)). The copyrights and patents clause reads:
The Congress shall have Power .. .To promote the Progress of Science and useful
Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors exclusive Right to their
respective Writings and Discoveries[.] (emphasis added).
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
80. Yen, supra note 6, at 394.
81. Id. at 394-95 (citing Schnapper v. Foley, 471 F. Supp. 426, 428 (D.D.C. 1979), aff'd,
667 F.2d 102 (D.C. Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 948 (1982); McGraw-Hill, Inc. v. Worth
Publishers, Inc. 335 F. Supp. 415, 422 (S.D.N.Y. 1971)).
82. Id.
83. Id. at 396. See, e.g., Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prods. v. McDonald's Corp., 562
F.2d 1157, 1170 (9th Cir. 1977).
84. Id. These rights include: the right to reproduce the work; the right to prepare derivative
works; the right to distribute copies of the work; the right to perform the work; and the right to
display the work publicly. Id. at 398 (citing 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1982)).
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C. Seeds of the Idea-Expression Dichotomy and the Doctrine of
Merger
The seminal case of Baker v. Selden85 is often cited as the source of
the idea-expression dichotomy,8 6 although the terms are not used in
the opinion, which speaks instead of a distinction between the "art"
and the "description of the art. ' 8 7 The explicit distinction between
ideas and expressions apparently was formulated first in another land-
mark case, Mazer v. Stein.8
Baker v. Selden is significant, however, for more than the intima-
tion of the idea-expression dichotomy. The case is also cited in sup-
port of the so-called "merger" doctrine, which is often invoked to
provide copyright protection even to the expression of ideas if the
ideas are susceptible to only one or a limited number of expressions.89
In Baker v. Selden, the plaintiff had published a series of copy-
righted books that contained an introductory explanation of a book-
keeping system and blank forms consisting of lines, blank columns,
and headings in a special arrangement designed to facilitate so-called
"double-entry" bookkeeping. 9° The defendant, whose books were ar-
ranged substantially under the same system, contended that the matter
alleged to be infringed was not the proper subject of copyright. 91 The
court reasoned that, where the art taught by a book cannot be applied
without using the methods and diagrams illustrating the book, these
85. 101 U.S. 99 (1880).
86. See, e.g., Toro Co. v. R & R Prods. Co., 787 F.2d 1208, 1212 (8th Cir. 1986). Section
102(b) of the 1976 Act is merely a codification of the idea-expression dichotomy developed in the
case law. Id. at 1211. This section was not meant to "enlarge[] or contract[] the scope of copy-
right protection .... Its purpose [was] to restate ... that the basic dichotomy between expres-
sion and idea remains unchanged." Id. at 1212 (citing H.R. Rep. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess.
57 (reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CoNo. & ADMIN. NEws 5659, 5670)).
87. Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 104-5 (1880). The "art" referred to was a "peculiar sys-
tem of book-keeping." Id. at 100.
88. 347 U.S. 201 (1954). "Unlike a patent, a copyright gives no exclusive right to the art
disclosed; protection is given only to the expression of the idea-not the idea itself." Id. at 217.
Mazer, which quotes Baker v. Selden, has also spawned a voluminous literature.
89. See Baker, 101 U.S. at 103-04. Although the Baker holding was limited to "blank ac-
count books," this case is usually taken to mean that blank forms are not copyrightable, an
important proposition because of its application to computer programs. See, e.g., Synercom
Technology, Inc. v. Universal Computing Co., 462 F. Supp. 1003 (N.D. Tex. 1987) (dealing with
the use of data cards and holding that input formats are non-protectable ideas); but see Whelan
Assocs. v. Jaslow Dental Lab., Inc., 797 F.2d 1222 (3d Cir. 1986) (concluding that the detailed
structure of a dental laboratory program is part of the expression, not the idea, of the program).
Note that a Copyright Office regulation specifically denies copyright protection to "[bilank
forms, such as time cards . . .account books . . .bank checks . . .order forms and the like,
which are designed for recording information and do not in themselves convey information." 37
C.F.R. § 202(l)(c) (1989).
90. Baker, 101 U.S. at 100.
91. Id.
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methods and diagrams are "necessary incidents to the art" and, there-
fore, within the public domain. 92 Consequently, the copyright could
not secure "the exclusive right to make, sell, and use account books
prepared upon the plan set forth in such a book." 93 In the later case
of Morrissey v. Procter & Gamble Co. ,94 the plaintiff owned the copy-
right to a set of rules for a sweepstakes-type promotion based on the
social security numbers of the participants, and the defendant Procter
& Gamble copied one of the rules almost verbatim. 95 The court, how-
ever, held for the defendant, reasoning that:
When the subject matter is very narrow, so that 'the topic necessarily
requires . . .' if not only one form of expression, at best only a
limited number, to permit copyrighting would mean that a party or
parties, by copyrighting a mere handful of forms, could exhaust all
possibilities of future use of the substance.96
Baker and Morrissey thus originated the doctrine of "merger,"
which has been described as "a close cousin to the idea-expression
dichotomy. ' ' 97 These and other cases such as Continental Casualty
Co. v. Beardsley,9" which upheld the copyrightability of more compli-
cated forms, 99 and Herbert Rosenthal Jewelry Corp. v. Kalpakian,1' °
which denied protection to jeweled bee pins because the idea and the
expression of such pins were regarded as indistinguishable, 0' defined
"idea" in an oblique way' 02-through the merger doctrine-and set
the stage for further developments. These cases are significant because
they indicate where abstraction meets concreteness for purposes of
copyright.
D. Variations on a Theme by Holmes
The Tree of Porphyry extends its branches to modern copyright be-
cause "there is nothing new under the sun."' 13 Moreover, in accor-
92. Id. at 103.
93. Id. at 104.
94. 379 F.2d 675(lst Cir. 1967).
95. Id. at 676.
96. Id. at 678.
97. Toro Co. v. R & R Prods. Co., 787 F.2d 1208, 1212 (8th Cir. 1986).
98. 253 F.2d 702 (2d Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 816 (1958).
99. Id. at 704. The forms here were for "a blanket bond to cover replacement of lost secu-
rities which would operate infuturo." Id. at 703. The court distinguished Baker v. Selden on the
grounds that the explanation of the accounting system could be treated as separable from ac-
count books, whereas the bonds and affidavits of Beardsley's plan were inseparable from the
language explaining it. Id. at 704.
100. 446 F.2d 738 (9th Cir. 1971).
101. Id. at 742.
102. Id.
103. ECCLES. 1:9.
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dance with this biblical precept, none of the tests or methods of
analysis devised to deal with the problems of abstraction flowing from
the idea-expression dichotomy seems to depart from the fundamental
principle of duality, nor does it offer a definitive answer to the ques-
tion of when to cut a category in two when competing works are being
compared. All of these tests seem to be variations on a theme by
Justice Holmes, the proscription against "copying the copy,"' 10 4 and
to represent a search for the analytical basis of that proscription.
1. Copying the Copy
A fundamental property right involved in copyright cases is obvi-
ously the right to make copies, 105 although other rights-and obliga-
tions-have always attached from the copyright acts. Therefore,
copying by the defendant is one of the two essential elements of a
copyright claim. 06 This Author submits that one of Justice Holmes'
most quoted phrases, "Others are free to copy the original[;] [t]hey
are not free to copy the copy,"' 0 7 amounts to an explanation of the
idea-expression dichotomy in its most basic terms. The original is the
idea; the copy is the expression of the idea, that is, "the personal reac-
tion of an individual upon nature." 08 Originals need not be notions
existing only in the mind, as in the case of those that may precede the
creation of abstract paintings or science-fiction scenes, but things,
such as the Grand Canyon of Colorado, or a person modeling a pose,
such as Oscar Wilde in the famous Sarony photograph.'°9 Thus, any
painter may paint the Grand Canyon and any photographer might
have pictured Oscar Wilde without infringing any existing copyrights
because these things are originals. A photograph of the photograph of
Oscar Wilde or a replica of a specific rendition of the Grand Canyon,
however, would be a copy of the copy, in other words, not an "origi-
nal work of authorship." ' 0
104. See generally Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239 (1903) (Holmes,
J.).
105. The first copyright statute in the English world was the Statute of Anne, which was
subtitled "An act for the encouragement of learning, by vesting the copies of printed books in
the authors or purchasers of such copies, during the times therein mentioned." 8 Anne, c. 19
(1710) (reprinted in R. BROWN & R. DENICOLA, CASES ON COPYRIGHT, UNFAIR COMPETITION AND
OTHER Topics BEARING ON THE PROTECTION OF LITERARY, MUSICAL, AND ARTISTIC WORKS, 211
(Stat. Supp. 1990)).
106. E.g., Stillman v. Leo Burnett Co., 720 F. Supp. 1353, 1356 (N.D. I11. 1989).
107. Bleistein, 188 U.S. at 249-50 (Holmes, J.) (citing Blunt v. Patten, 3 Fed. Cas. 763
(C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1828) (No. 1580)).
108. Id. at 250.
109. The "Sarony photograph" was at issue in Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony,
II1 U.S. 53 (1884).
110. Toro Co. v. R & R Prods. Co., 787 F.2d 1208, 1213 (8th Cir. 1986).
1990]
234 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LA WREVIEW [Vol. 18:221
The test of originality in copyrights, as opposed to the requirement
of novelty in trademarks, has a "low threshold" because, as we have
seen,"' copyright does not protect ideas but rather "the art dis-
closed." 1" 2 A threshold, however, is "still a threshold,""' 3 and the
party asserting a claim must pass it to prevail, even in the case of a
map, for example, where creativity can only be minimal." 4 This low
threshold simply requires that the author make the work 5-that it be
an expression and not merely an appropriation.
2. Substantial Similarity
But what is a copy as opposed to an original? A photocopy of a
book, for example, is obviously a copy." 6 If a defendant merely para-
phrases a book, however, the paraphrase may still be a copy, which
cannot be understood only as a literal reproduction, "else a plagiarist
would escape by immaterial variations." "7 To deal with this problem,
the courts use "substantial similarity" as the standard of infringe-
ment." 8 A play, for example, "may be pirated without using the dia-
logue" because "[sipeech is only a small part of a dramatist's means
of expression. '"" 9 On the other hand, two competing works may be
almost identical and not "substantially similar."
111. See supra text accompanying notes 68-76.
112. Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 217 (1954).
113. Toro, 787 F.2d at 1213.
114. See Alfred Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts, Inc., 191 F.2d 99, 102-03 (2d Cir. 1951). In
copyright, an original work is one that .'owes its origin' to the 'author.' No large measure of
novelty is necessary." Id. at 102.
115. Id. at 103.
116. Whether the photocopy infringes a copyright is another question. Copying has two dis-
tinct meanings under copyright law: factual copying, which may be "fair use," see 17 U.S.C. §
107 (1988), and copying that is infringing. Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 81 F.2d
49, 54 (2d Cir. 1936), cert. denied, 298 U.S. 669 (1936). For a discussion of the confusion gener-
ated by these two meanings, see infra text accompanying notes 175-185.
117. Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930), cert. denied, 282
U.S. 902 (1931).
118. See 3 NrMMIER ON COPYRIHT § 13.03 (1989). Judge Learned Hand explained that "it is
enough that substantial parts were lifted; no plagiarist can excuse the wrong by showing how
much of his work he did not pirate." Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 81 F.2d 49, 56
(2d Cir. 1936), cert. denied, 298 U.S. 669 (1936).
119. Sheldon, 81 F.2d at 55. In Sheldon, the defendants had made a "picture play" called
"Letty Lynton" that tracked the plaintiff's copyrighted play, "Dishonored Lady." Both works
dealt with a "wanton" woman who poisons her lover to end an affair "that stood in the way of
a respectable marriage." Id. at 50. "Dishonored Lady" was based on a real-life Scottish case
that became a cause celebre and was published in book form in 1927. Id. at 49. Even if the
original book had been copyrighted, the authors of "Dishonored Lady" were entitled to their
copyright because they took from the book only the bare skeleton. Id. at 50. In "Letty Lynton,"
however, the defendants appropriated from "Dishonored Lady" the "confluents of all these
means [to build a play], bound together in an inseparable unity .... which keeps the whole
dramatic meaning." Id. at 55-56.
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In Franklin Mint Corp. v. National Wildlife Art Exchange,120 for
example, a wildlife artist made a painting titled "Cardinals on Apple
Blossom" and later assigned his copyright to National Wildlife Art
Exchange.' 2' Years later, the artist made another painting using some
of the same sources, such as preliminary sketches, photos, and a
drawing, but using also slides of foliage, cardinal photographs, and
stuffed birds not used in creating "Cardinals on Apple Blossom.' ' 2
The Art Exchange claimed that the new painting, titled "The Cardi-
nal," infringed the assigned copyright. 12  The court held that even
though the ideas were similar, the expressions were not, partly because
"in ornithological art . . . minute attention to detail of plumage and
other physical characteristics is required and the stance of the birds
must be anatomically correct." 124
Decisions drawing the line according to the substantial similarity
test "must therefore inevitably be ad hoc."'15 In the case of verbal
works, "no principle can be stated as to when an imitator has gone
beyond copying the 'idea,' and has borrowed its 'expression,' ",126
while in the case of designs, which depend on the aesthetics of the
individual, "the test is, if possible, even more intangible." 2 7
Substantial similarity, therefore, is a troublesome test. 28 To eluci-
date it, Professor Nimmer coined the terms "Comprehensive Nonli-
teral Similarity" and "Fragmented Literal Similarity." 2 9 The first
refers to the re-creation of the "fundamental essence or structure of
120. 575 F.2d 62 (3d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 880 (1978).
121. Id. at 63-64.
122. Id. at 62-64.
123. Id. at 63.
124. Id. at 66; but cf. Gross v. Seligman, 212 F. 930 (2d Cir. 1914). In Gross, an artist
photographed a model in the nude, sold the copyright, and two years later photographed the
same model in the same pose, except that she was smiling and holding a cherry stem between her
teeth. Id. The court held that the defendant had infringed the copyright by publishing the second
photograph. Id. at 932; accord Alt v. Morello, 227 U.S.P.Q. 49 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1985) (concern-
ing an advertising photograph of a Cross pen and pencil against a specific background and at a
specific angle); see also Kisch v. Ammirati & Puris Inc., 657 F. Supp. 380 (S.D.N.Y. 1987)
(denying summary judgment to a defendant who created an advertisement by photographing a
model with a musical instrument, where the model and the instrument were different, but the
background, camera angles, lighting, and other elements were similar).
125. Peter Pan Fabrics, Inc. v. Martin Weiner Corp., 274 F.2d 487, 489 (2d Cir. 1960).
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. While, technically, originality can be found simply where the work constitutes a "dis-
tinguishable variation," substantial similarity "presents one of the most difficult questions in
copyright law, and one which is the least susceptible of helpful generalizations." 3 NIMMER ON
COPYRIGHT § 13.03[A] (1989). The concepts of originality and substantial similarity should not
be confused. Id.
129. 1 NUDAER ON COPYRIGHT § 13.03[A][11-[2] (1989).
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one work" in another, which applies to situations where the similarity
is comprehensive but not word-for-word, nor some other type of lit-
eral similarity. 30 The second applies to situations of literal similarity
of fragments, though not necessarily word-for-word, where the out-
line of the plaintiff's work has not been copied. 3' Where literal simi-
larity is found, the difficulty of determining the degree of abstraction
where similarity rises to the level of ideas does not exist "because lit-
eral similarity by definition is always a similarity as to the expression
of ideas." 3 2 The problem remains, however, what degree of substan-
tial similarity is an infringement. 3' The essential problem of abstrac-
tion, therefore, remains unresolved under the Comprehensive
Nonliteral Similarity analysis and merely shifts from one field of dis-
course to another in the application of Fragmented Literal Similarity
analysis, that is, substantial versus insubstantial as opposed to idea
versus expression.
3. The Abstractions Test
Judge Learned Hand formulated his famous "abstractions test" in
Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp. 3 4 Here, the plaintiff was the
owner of a copyright on the play "Abie's Irish Rose," which dealt
with a wealthy Jewish father's obsessive desire for his son to marry an
orthodox Jewish girl, his son's secret union with a Catholic girl, the
father's discovery of the truth, the father abjuring the son, and an
eventual reconciliation precipitated by the birth of grandchildren. '
The defendant had produced a movie-play, "The Cohens and the Kel-
lys," dealing. with two poor families-one Jewish and the other
130. Id. at § 13.03[A].
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. See id.
134. 45 F.2d 119 (2d Cir. 1930), cert. denied, 282 U.S. 902 (1931). Here, Judge Learned
Hand "authored the most widely quoted distinction between idea and expression," Yen, supra
note 6, at 404.
Upon any work, and especially upon a play, a great number of patterns of increasing
generality will fit equally well, as more and more of the incident is left out. The last
may perhaps be no more than the most general statement of what the play is about,
and at times might consist only of its title; but there is a point in this series of abstrac-
tions where they are no longer protected, since otherwise the playwright could prevent
the use of his "ideas," to which, apart from their expression, his property is never
extended.
Nichols, 45 F.2d at 121. The "abstractions test," however, has been criticized as "not a test at
all," but rather as "a clever way to pose the difficulties that require courts to avoid either ex-
treme of the continuum of generality." Nash v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 899 F.2d
1537, 1540 (7th Cir. 1990).
135. Nichols, 45 F.2d at 120.
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Irish-living side by side in a state of enmity, the secret marriage of
the Jewish daughter and the Irish boy, the daughter bearing a child,
and eventual reconciliation of the two families. 3 6 One problem is that,
concerning plays, the copying may involve only a scene or part of the
dialogue, so that the question becomes whether the part taken is so
substantial as to constitute infringement. 3 7 When the copy involves an
abstract of the whole rather than sections literally lifted from the orig-
inal, the question is more difficult.'38
Thus, some ideas may be so abstract that they are no longer pro-
tected, but past a certain boundary expressions become sufficiently
concrete to constitute infringement. 39 According to Judge Hand,
however, "[n]obody has been able to fix that boundary, and nobody
ever can.' 140 Nichols, therefore, has been criticized because it did not
formulate a principle to divide ideas from expressions; Judge Learned
Hand simply compared the two works and "instinctively decided
whether the similarity was literal enough to warrant a finding of in-
fringement. ' ' 4' Although the abstractions test is regarded as the best
effort in dealing with the idea-expression dichotomy,142 one critique
argued that it is no test at all because of Judge Hand's belated caveat
thirty years after Nichols.143 The caveat, articulated in Peter Pan Fab-
rics, Inc. v. Martin Weiner Corp. 1 4 4 is the recognition that
136. Id. at 120-21. The movie-play, of course, contained variations on the basic "Obstacles
to Love" theme. See the 28th Sittiation in G. PoLt, infra note 149. For example, the Jewish
father is informed by his lawyer that he has unexpectedly come into a large inheritance. The
father and his daughter move to a great house, where he proceeds to chase away his daughter's
poor Irish boyfriend. The two kids secretly marry. The lawyer, however, seeing that his plan to
marry the Jewish girl was spoiled, reveals to the father that the fortune really belonged to the
Irishman's family and proposes to hide this knowledge in return for a share of the wealth. Ni-
chols, 45 F.2d at 121. The Jewish father's honest behavior then leads to the reconciliation with
the Irish father. Id.
137. Id. The court in Nichols began its analysis by stating:
It is of course essential to any protection of literary property . . . that the right cannot
be limited literally to the text, else a plagiarist would escape by immaterial varia-
tions.... [Blut, as soon as literal appropriation ceases to be the test, the whole matter
is necessarily at large, so that ... the decisions cannot help much in a new case.
Id.
138. Id.
139. See id.
140. Id. Treating the question as analogous to copying a part of the original is not a satisfac-
tory solution because "though the skeleton is a part of the body, it pervades and supports the
whole." Id. In such cases, the problem again is establishing where ideas end and expressions
begin. See id.
141. Yen, supra note 6, at 405.
142. Id. at 405.
143. Knowles & Palmieri, Dissecting Krofft: An Expression of New Ideas in Copyright?, 8
SAN FERN. V.L. REV. 109, 118 (1980).
144. 274 F.2d 487 (2d Cir. 1960).
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"[o]bviously no principle can be stated as to when an imitator has
gone beyond copying the 'idea' and has borrowed its 'expression.' "145
The absence of such a principle creates uncertainty where the courts
attempt to balance the first amendment with copyright law. 
14
Characters and plot are at the center of the controversy in dramatic
works. 47 Although characters may be copyrighted, substantial similar-
ity is very difficult to establish in characters because, unless very
clearly delineated, they constitute no more than ideas.'" Do any origi-
nal plots exist, moreover, for fiction or drama? Novelists, dramatists,
and other writers believe that new plots are nonexistent but are rather
variations on a relatively small number of basic situations. 149 Margaret
Mitchell's Gone with the Wind, for example, combines two standard
situations, "Daring Enterprises" 50 (often employed in modern adven-
ture stories such as Frederick Forsyth's The Day of the Jackal), and
"Obstacles to Love."''
Sid & Marty Krofft Television Productions v. McDonald's Corp. ,152
recognized the difficulty involved in "distill[ing] the unprotected idea
from the protected expression" and endorsed Judge Learned Hand's
145. Id. at 489.
146. See Yen, supra note 6, at 420. The author uses the metaphor of a "slippery slope,"
which implies an undesirable position at the bottom, but recognizes that, at best, the idea-ex-
pression dichotomy can be used "to properly limit copyright law." Id. at 405.
147. Knowles & Palmieri, supra note 143, at 489.
148. See Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119 (2d Cir. 1930), cert. denied, 282
U.S. 902 (1931), where Judge Learned Hand said in often-quoted dicta:
If Twelfth Night were copyrighted, it is quite possible that a second comer might so
closely imitate Sir Toby Belch or Malvolio as to infringe, but it would not be enough
that for one of his characters he cast a riotous knight who kept wassail to the discom-
fort of the household, or a vain and foppish steward who became amorous of his
mistress. These would be no more than Shakespeare's "ideas" in the play ....
Id. at 121; see also Berman & Boxer, Copyright Infringement of Audiovisual Works and Char-
acters, 52 S. CAL. L. REv. 315, 325-26 (1979) (discussing the effect of the "Sam Spade" case,
Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inic., 216 F.2d 945 (9th Cir. 1954),
cert. denied, 348 U.S. 971 (1955), which was cited as authority for the proposition that charac-
ters as such are not copyrightable); but see, e.g., Walt Disney Prods. v. Air Pirates, 345 F. Supp.
108 (N.D. Cal. 1972) (finding copyright infringement of Disney cartoon characters by bawdy
"counterculture" versions of the characters); 1 NIMMER ON CoMsUorrr § 2.12, at 2-175 (1988)
(cartoon characters or other graphic representations are more easily protected than "word por-
traits").
149. G. POLTI, THE THIRTY-SIX DRAMATIc SrrUATIONs 3 (1986). "[The 18th century Italian
dramatist Carlo] 'Gozzi maintained that there can be but thirty-six tragic situations. Schiller
took great pains to find more, but he was unable to find even so many as Gozzi."' Id. at 7.
150. Polti's ninth situation. Id.
151. Id. at 36, 93. The latter is Polti's 28th situation. The essential elements of the ninth
situation, see supra note 149 and accompanying text, for example, are a bold leader, an object,
and an adversary. Id. at 36. The conflict in this situation is clearly drawn and undisguised, and
involves "[a] clever plan, a bold attempt, sangfroid[I-and victory!" Id.
152. 562 F.2d 1157 (9th Cir. 1977).
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"abstractions test," which requires copying not only the expressions
of the idea, but also the idea itself for a finding of substantial similar-
ity.' But the test for "substantial similarity" is more complex when
expressions must be distinguished than when ideas are distinguished;
therefore, the test for similarity of ideas is "a factual one, to be de-
cided by the trier of fact."' 5 4 The inquiry, then, is whether the expres-
sion provides something new or contributes to the idea. 5' This inquiry
is equivalent to determining whether the work is based on the original
or the copy, except that it purports to subtract the idea portion from
the whole and to consider only the expressions. The test, however,
fails to resolve the problems of abstraction, does not provide a defini-
tion of an idea, and fails to recognize that numerous ideas, rather
than a single Platonic form, go into the making of an original work of
authorship.
Some commentators argued that Krofft provides the missing link in
the abstractions test through an application of the "extrinsic" and
"intrinsic" tests, 5 6 sometimes seen as another version of Arnstein v.
Porter's15 7 bifurcated method for proving copying and substantial sim-
ilarity. Such tests, according to those commentators, obviate Judge
Hand's invitation to make ad hoc decisions and allow the courts to
draw a distinct line on the "idea-expression continuum." 5 ' Adding to
the complexity of the previous intellectual scaffolding, then, determin-
ing substantial similarity between ideas, according to Krofft, calls for
an "extrinsic test," which depends not on the trier of fact's reactions
but on objective criteria-including "the type of artwork involved,
the materials used, the subject matter, and the setting for the sub-
ject." 5 9 In turn, the test to determine substantial similarity between
expressions is "intrinsic" because it depends on the perspective of the
ordinary reasonable person.16' Under the intrinsic test, therefore, ana-
lytic dissection and expert testimony are inappropriate. 161
153. Id. at 1163.
154. Id. at 1164.
155. See Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prods. v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d 1157, 1168
(9th Cir. 1977). Thus,
Michaelangelo's David is, as an idea, no more than a statue of a nude male. But no
one would question the proposition that[,J if [it were] a copyrighted work[,J it would
deserve protection even against the poorest of imitations. This is because so much
more was added in the expression over the idea.
Id. at 1168. One could argue, however, that the additions themselves are ideas too and that the
statue embodies many ideas.
156. Knowles & Palmieri, supra note 143, at 119.
157. 154 F.2d 464 (2d Cir. 1946).
158. Knowles & Palmieri, supra note 143, at 119.
159. Krofft, 562 F.2d at 1164.
160. Id.
161. Id. Krofft embraced the standard of "total concept and feel," infra note 197, a catchy
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In the Krofft case, the plaintiffs had created a children's television
program that became highly successful when broadcast Saturday
mornings.1 62 One year after introducing the show, the plaintiffs were
approached by one of the defendants, an advertising agency that was
trying to obtain the account of the McDonald's restaurant chain, to
work on a project using the "Living Island" theme and "H.R. Puf-
nstuf" characters of the television series.' 63 Following several rounds
of negotiations, the advertising agency eventually told the plaintiffs
that the advertising campaign had been cancelled, when in fact the
agency had already obtained the account and was going forward with
its so-called "McDonaldland" project. 164 The agency also hired for-
mer employees of the plaintiff to make the costumes and supply some
of the voices for the characters. 61
The defendants argued that, even though they copied the idea of the
television series-a fantasyland of various fanciful characters-their
expression was too dissimilar for a finding of infringement.' 66 The de-
fendants' argument was based on a "dissection" of such elements as
the characters, setting, and plot of the television series. 167 The court of
appeal, however, upheld the jury finding of infringement' 68 and re-
jected the proposed dissection because such an approach ignored the
idea-expression dichotomy, 69 even though characters do not easily re-
ceive protection, 70 the plot of a television commercial is insubstantial
at best, and the setting could have been regarded as scenes a faire,
which are unprotected.' 7' The defendant's dissection approach, the
court reasoned, "ignore[d] the idea-expression dichotomy alluded to
in Arnstein,"'7 2 which lead to the creation of the two-step determina-
tion: the "extrinsic," objective test allowing analytic dissection and
161. Id. Krofft embraced the standard of "total concept and feel," infra note 197, a catchy
phrase some commentators believe leads to a slippery slope where copyright is unfortunately
extended to undeserving subject matter. See 3 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 13.03[A][1][c] (1989);
Yen, supra note 6, at 397, 412, 416, 419-20.
162. Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prods., Inc. v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d 1157, 1161
(9th Cir. 1977).
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 1165.
167. Id.
168. Id. at 1175.
169. Id. at 1165.
170. See Berman & Boxer, supra note 148, at 325-30.
171. E.g., Data East USA, Inc. v. Epyx, Inc., 862 F.2d 204, 208 (9th Cir. 1988).
172. Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prods. v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d 1157, 1165 (9th
Cir. 1977) (referring to Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464 (2d Cir. 1946), which created a bifur-
cated test to establish infringement requiring that both ideas and expressions have been copied).
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expert testimony to determine whether the similarities are sufficient to
prove copying,173 and the "intrinsic," subjective test "depending on
the response of the ordinary reasonable person" to determine substan-
tial similarity. 174
4. Copying versus Copying
Why not simply say that the defendant copied the copy? The an-
swer, articulated in Stillman v. Leo Burnett Co., 175 lies at the root of
the semantic confusion regarding another ambiguous term, "copy-
ing." This elementary term receives two totally different meanings in
cases such as Atari v. North American Philips Consumer Electronics
Corp. 176 Here, in following another basic two-step in the analysis of a
copyright claim-proving ownership of the copyright in a work and
proving the copying of the copyrighted work in the creation of an-
other work177 -the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals established a cir-
cular framework. 178 The plaintiff, in that framework, had to prove
substantial similarity to prove copying and had to prove copying to
prove substantial similarity. 179 The circularity resulted from the appli-
cation of the second essential element to a copyright claim, "that the
defendant copied from the plaintiff's work and [] [that] the copying,
if proven, went so far as to constitute an improper appropriation."'' 80
The confusion resulted because of the two different meanings of
"copying" as an element of a copyright claim and "copying" as the
second prong of substantial similarity. 181 In the first usage, copying
refers to "whether the defendant violated the copyright laws by repro-
ducing protectible [sic] expression from the plaintiff's work." 8 2 In the
second usage, copying refers to "the purely factual issue of whether
the defendant used the plaintiff's work as a starting point for his
own."' 83 It follows that a defendant may copy as a factual matter but
not in the legal sense that would make him or her liable.'8 The defen-
173. Arnstein, 154 F.2d at 468.
174. Krofft, 562 F.2d at 1164.
175. 720 F. Supp. 1353 (N.D. Ill. 1989).
176. 672 F.2d 607 (7th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 880 (1982).
177. Stillman v. Leo Burnett Co., 720 F. Supp. 1353, 1356 (N.D. Ill. 1989) (citing 3 NIMMER
ON COPYRIGHT § 13.01 (1989)).
178. Stillman, 720 F. Supp. at 1357.
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. Id.
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dant must have copied something protected by the copyright laws,
"specifically, the plaintiff's expression of his ideas," to be liable.8 5
Therefore, the Stillman court would escape from Atari's circular
trap by explaining that the actual meaning had to be that "the plain-
tiff must establish at least permissible copying as a prerequisite to
proving illicit copying."'' 86 But even after Stillman cut this Gordian
Knot, the Atari court was out on a limb on the dual meaning of "sub-
stantial similarity." 87
On the one hand, "substantial similarity can refer to the likeness
between two works sufficient to give rise to an inference, when sup-
ported by evidence of access, that the defendant took ideas from the
plaintiff's work.' ' 88 On the other hand, the courts use it as a term of
art "relating to the unlawful nature of the similarities between two
works." 8 9
The problem with Atari is that it refers to substantial similarity in
the sense related to likeness while it introduces the type of test neces-
sary to establish unlawful nature.' 90 The obfuscation supposedly dis-
solves with the assertion that the copying-unlawful appropriation
distinction is simply a consequence of the idea-expression dichotomy,
or the decision not to protect ideas, procedures, and concepts.' 9' But
the problems of abstraction refuse to disappear because "the intrinsic-
extrinsic analysis ... does not fully encompass the infringement in-
quiry.' 1 92 Although the response of two works on the ordinary ob-
server may be the same, that response may be due to the ideas
common to both rather than their expressions. 93
5. Total Concept and Feel
An increasingly popular test for substantial similarity asks
whether the defendant has captured the "total concept and feel" of
the work. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals introduced that test
in Roth Greeting Cards v. United Card Co. 194 and now regards it as
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. Id. at 1357-58.
188. Id. at 1358.
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Id. at 1359.
193. Id. at 1360.
194. 429 F.2d 1106 (9th Cir. 1970). Roth dealt with the copyrightability of greeting cards and
is significant only for the introduction of the total concept and feel standard.
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the test for substantial similarity of expression. 9 Reyher v. Chil-
dren's Television Workshop 96 and Krofft 97 are key cases in this
area of the law.
In Reyher, the author and the illustrator of a copyrighted children's
book, My Mother is the Most Beautiful Woman in the World, sued
for infringement the television network that produced the popular
"Sesame Street" program. On appeal, the author explained that her
mother had told her the story of the book as a folk tale during the
author's childhood in Russia. 98 The tale concerned a little girl who
becomes separated from her mother and, coming upon some villagers
who asked what her mother looked like, describes her mother as the
most beautiful woman in the world.'99 One of the defendants also tes-
tified that he remembered the theme from a script based on a story he
had told his sister in the distant past, and had never seen the author's
work.2 00o The illustrator, likewise, said that he remembered reading the
folk tale during his childhood but had not seen the supposedly pirated
illustrations and that the similarities between the drawings were coin-
cidental .201
The court first rejected a claim that the second work was deriva-
tive, 202 reasoning that, if borrowed material consists only of ideas,
even if a work is derived partly from earlier works, it is not a deriva-
tive work. 203 The court then decided that "in addition to the essential
sequence of events, we might properly consider the 'total concept and
feel' of the work in question." 204 The inquiry was whether the defen-
dant had used simply the idea of the first author or descended into the
realm of concrete expression. 205 Because the stories were addressed to
children and thus were simpler than the type of work usually submit-
195. See, e.g., Atari v. Northern Am. Philips Consumer Elecs. Corp., 672 F.2d 607 (7th Cir.
1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 880 (1982). The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, however, qualified
that test in Cooling Sys. & Flexibles, Inc. v. Stuart Radiator, Inc., 777 F.2d 485 (9th Cir. 1985).
See infra notes 212-18 and accompanying text.
196. 533 F.2d 87 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 980 (1976).
197. Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prods., Inc. v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d 1157 (9th
Cir. 1977). In Krofft, the court decided that the defendant's works were substantially similar to
the plaintiffs' because "they captured the 'total concept and feel' of the Pufnstuf show." Id. at
1167.
198. Reyher v. Children's Television Workshop, 533 F.2d 87, 88-89 (2d Cir. 1976), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 980 (1976).
199. Reyher, 533 F.2d at 92.
200, Id. at 89.
201. Id. at 89.
202. Derivative works are also protected by copyright. 17 U.S.C. § 103 (1988).
203. Reyher, 533 F.2d at 90.
204. Id. at 91.
205. Id.
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ted to pattern analysis, the essential sequence of events was not the
decisive question.2°0 Consequently, the extrinsic test was invalid be-
cause experts play no part in the ordinary observer analysis. But the
intrinsic test or ordinary observer analysis cannot be thrust upon chil-
dren incapable of grasping evanescent copyright postulates. The result
was that the court found no infringement even though the two works
narrated similar events-, which were labeled scenes a faire or obliga-
tory follow-ups to basic dramatic situations. 20 7
More significantly, however, was the difference in total feel,28 ex-
plained as dissimilarity in mood, detail, and characterization. What
the works shared was only the "thematic concept" that the mother's
face is, subjectively, the most beautiful in the world to a child. 2°9 Re-
yher, therefore, approaches the Platonic concept of preexisting
ideas. 210 Perhaps its most important contribution is the advancement
of "concept" and "feel" in the analysis of copyright issues where pre-
vious law clearly established that expressions-not concepts-and ob-
jective dissection-rather than subjective tests-establish substantial
similarity in the sense of infringement.
The "total concept and feel" cases spawned by Roth and Krofft
have been criticized for enforcing vague claims of copyright and caus-
ing a "massive restructuring of the distinction between idea and ex-
pression that Judge Hand defined [through the abstractions test). ' ' 21
Perhaps aware of the problems inherent in its strong view of protected
expression in Krofft, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals modified its
approach to substantial similarity in subsequent decisions. In Cooling
Systems & Flexibles, Inc. v. Stuart Radiator, Inc. ,22 for example, the
court rejected a copyright infringement claim brought by the publisher
of a radiator catalog against a competitor that had published a nearly
identical work. 21 Factual works, the court reasoned, are fundamen-
tally different from more artistic works. 2 4 Alluding to the merger doc-
trine, the court added that in the case of radiator catalogs, the range
of possible expressions is "extremely narrow. ' 215 In such a case, the
use of the intrinsic test for substantial similarity established in Krofft
206. Cf. id.
207. Reyher, 533 F.2d at 92. For example, a happy reunion usually follows the protagonist
lost children when they eventually find their parents.
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. See supra text accompanying notes 36-39.
211. Yen, supra note 6, at 407, 410.
212. 777 F.2d 485 (9th Cir. 1985).
213. Id. at 493.
214. Id. at 491.
215. Id.
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is not appropriate. 2 6 Thus, the plaintiff's contention that a reasonable
observer would find the catalogs in question indistinguishable was ir-
relevant. 2 7 "What is important is not whether there is substantial sim-
ilarity in the total concept and feel of the works . . ., but whether the
... protectible expression [in the copyrighted work] is substantially
similar to the equivalent portions [in the work of the alleged in-
fringer] ."218
In Aliotti v. R. Dakin Co.,219 where the plaintiff claimed copyright
infringement in her line of stuffed toy dinosaurs, the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals expanded on this qualification. In a situation remi-
niscent of Krofft, the plaintiff and her employer contacted the defen-
dant about buying the entire company and its product line. The
defendant looked at the plaintiff's designs, but decided against buying
the company. The defendant developed its own product line, which
was generally similar to the plaintiff's. 220 The court, in spite of Roth
and Krofft, rejected the infringement claim, 22' reasoning that "[n]o
copyright protection may be afforded to the idea of producing stuffed
dinosaur toys or to elements of expression that necessarily follow
from the idea of such dolls. ' 222 Therefore, similarity in the "physiog-
nomy of dinosaurs" and "the nature of stuffed animals" was irrele-
vant. 223 Other courts, however, have not adopted this limitation,
which strengthens the concept of idea as a counterbalance to the en-
larged concept of expression 224 effected by Roth and Krofft.225 The
"total concept and feel" standard, then, presents serious difficul-
ties.22 6
216. Id. at 492.
217. Id. at 493.
218. Id.; see also, e.g., Stillman v. Leo Burnett Co., 720 F. Supp. 1353, 1359 (N.D. 111. 1989)
("[W]hen the similarity between two works arises exclusively from the use of the same process or
technique-for example, the similar 'concept and feel' of two impressionistic paintings-it can-
not form the basis for a copyright claim.").
219. 831 F.2d 898 (9th Cir. 1987).
220. Id. at 900.
221. Id. at 901-02.
222. Id.; accord Data East USA, Inc. v. Epyx, Inc. 862 F.2d 204, 208 (9th Cir. 1988) (No
substantial similarity will be found where, as in the case of a video game dealing with the sport
of karate, the idea and the expression are inseparable, to prevent granting a monopoly on the
idea to the copyright owner.).
223. Allioti, 831 F.2d at 901.
224. Yen, supra note 6, at 412.
225. See, e.g., Broderbund Software, Inc. v. Unison World, Inc., 648 F. Supp. 1127 (N.D.
Cal. 1986) (identifying the "idea" of two competing computer programs with the "purpose" of
creating a number of graphic and textual displays).
226. See, e.g., 3 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 13.03[A], at 13-35 (1989) ('Concepts' are statuto-
rily ineligible for copyright protection; for courts to advert to a work's 'total concept' as the
essence of its protectible [sic] character seems ill-advised in the extreme. Further, the addition of
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These difficulties multiply in computer software cases where the
courts, apparently inspired by the "total concept and feel" standard,
have confused protected expression with the program code and unpro-
tected ideas with the program's function. 227 Because few judges or ju-
ries understand the concepts underlying the production of computer
software, the ordinary observer test is again rendered inadequate. 22 If
the infringing program resembles the original, "it is tempting to
equate the unprotected ideas with overall program function, avoiding
the necessity of looking inside [the programs]." 229 This is the mistake
of Whelan Associates, Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Laboratories, Inc. ,230 a
widely criticized decision. 23'
In Whelan, the trial court found that copyright could be extended
beyond the literal computer code of a program to non-literal elements
such as its sequence .and organization-its structure. 2 2 The court of
appeals upheld the finding after evaluating the evidence of substantial
similarity between the overall structures of the programs and conclud-
ing that it was sufficient, 233 even though the district court did not fihd
any copying of the source or object codes and the plaintiff did not
allege such copying. 2 4 Citing Krofft and Nichols, among other cases,
the court reasoned that computer programs are classified as literary
works, which can be infringed even in the absence of substantial simi-
larity in the works' literal elements. 235
Alluding to Baker v. Selden,236 the court then proposed a rule to
distinguish ideas from expression in computer programs that may be
an improper introduction of the metaphysical concept of "final
causes" 23 7 into copyright law: 238 "the purpose or function of a utilitar-
'feel' to the judicial inquiry, being a wholly amorphous referent, merely invites an abdication of
analysis.' '(citation omitted)).
227. Brinson, Copyrighted Software: Separating the Protected Expression from Unprotected
Ideas, A Starting Point, 29 B.C.L. REv. 803 (1988).
228. See Whelan Assocs. v. Jaslow Dental Lab., Inc., 797 F.2d 1222, 1232 (3d Cir. 1986).
229. Brinson, supra note 227, at 831.
230. 797 F.2d 1222 (3d Cir. 1986).
231. Yen, supra note 6, at 414 (citing Note, Does Form Follow Function? The Idea/Expres-
sion Dichotomy in Copyright Protection of Computer Software, 35 UCLA L. REv. 723 (1988));
G. Davis, Computer Software-The Final Frontier: Clones, Compatibility and Copyright, COM-
PUTER LAW (June 1985); Goldstein, Infringement of Copyright in Computer Programs, 47 U.
PITT. L. REV. 1119 (1986).
232. Whelan, 797 F.2d at 1224-25, aff'g 609 F. Supp. 1307 (E.D. Pa. 1985), cert. denied, 479
U.S. 1031 (1987).
233. Id.
234. Id. at 1233.
235. Id. at 1234.
236. 101 U.S. 99 (1880). See supra text accompanying notes 85-93.
237. See supra note 49.
238. See, e.g., Brinson, supra note 227.
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ian work would be the work's idea, and everything that is not neces-
sary to that purpose or function would be part of the expression of
the idea. ' 23 9 In Whelan, the court of appeals adopted the lower
court's conclusion that the purpose of the program was simply the
efficient operation of a dental laboratory. 240 The court also adopted
the lower court's reasoning that other programs on the market serving
the same purpose were evidence that the idea was subject to many
different expressions; 24' therefore, Baker v. Selden's concept of
merger was inapplicable.
By adopting a definition of "idea" limited to program function,
however, everything in a program at a lower level of abstraction
amounts to protected expression.242 The Whelan court apparently ig-
nored the way in which computer programmers write programs-pro-
ceeding from more abstract levels of function to more concrete
problem-solving steps that put many ideas, not a single idea, to
work. 243 As a consequence of defining idea at the level of overall pro-
gram function and failing to recognize the presence of many ideas in a
computer program, the court "deprive[d] later program developers of
their rightful use of the ideas used in the original program." 2" The
Whelan case, therefore, stands as a major example of the improper
application of the idea-expression dichotomy, because it fails to apply
the limiting principle of the dichotomy that ideas are not protected. 245
The Whelan court, however, could have applied traditional "levels of
abstractions" analysis to one substantive area-computer program-
ing-that is particularly well suited for such analysis.24
239. Whelan, 797 F.2d at 1236 (emphasis removed). This rule would have no application to
"works of literature or 'non-functional' visual representations [where] defining the purpose of
the work may be difficult." Id. at 1238.
240. Id. at 1238-39.
241. Id. at 1238; but see Plains Cotton Coop. v. Goodpasture Computer Serv., Inc., 807
F.2d 1256 (5th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 821 (1987) (affirming that the sequence and
organization of software designed to help cotton sales were ideas determined by the characteris-
tics of the cotton market); Synercom Technology, Inc. v. University Computing Co., 462 F.
Supp. 1003 (N.D. Tex. 1978) (holding that the organization and structure of input formats or the
configurations of data that go into a program are not copyrightable because they merge with the
underlying idea).
242. Brinson, supra note 227, at 831.
243. See id. at 830-31. In other software cases dealing with the idea-expression dichotomy,
the courts have recognized that software contains many uncopyrightable ideas. See id. at 834 and
cases cited therein.
244. Id. at 847. This method of analysis could stifle so-called "clean-room" procedures by
software developers. See id. at 852-53.
245. See id. at 831; but see Note, Differentiating Idea and Expression in Copyrighted Com-
puter Software: The Tests for Infringement, 6 J.L. & COM. 419 (1987) (concluding that the Whe-
lan opinion formulates a test that "will be useful in the future" but recognizing that "a new law
has been created").
246. See generally Brinson, supra note 227.
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6. Other Major Tests
Professor Nimmer recommends Professor Chafee's "pattern" test
as the answer to "this most difficult question":
No doubt the line does lie somewhere between the author's idea and
the precise form in which he wrote it down. I like to say that the
protection covers the 'pattern' of the work ... the sequence of
events, and the development of the interplay of characters. 247
Chafee's pattern test operates in conjunction with Judge Hand's ab-
straction test 248 but "does little more than Judge Hand's" formulation
because, like other tests, it fails to explain where to divide the
branches of the tree of abstractions249 and simply appears to restate
Professor Nimmer's Comprehensive Nonliteral Similarity test, 2 0
which is in turn "substantially similar" to Judge Hand's "abstrac-
tions test." ' 25 ' What none of the tests provide, however, is the basic
"W's" of Who, When, and How. 252
A natural outgrowth of the "total concept and feel" standard is the
increasingly popular "look and feel" standard. 253 In one line of cases,
"look and feel" relates to computer screens that can be copyrighted
individually or as part of a program.25 4 A screen, also called "user
interface," is the design of the video image and the way it presents
information. 255 These cases deal especially with enhancements to exist-
ing programs and, therefore, present the problem of separating the
cumulus of free ideas in the public domain that go into the writing of
the program from the specific expression, but not process, technique,
system, procedure, principle, discovery, or method of operation,
which are in the same category as ideas under the 1976 Act. 256
In another line of cases, "look and feel" relates to materials such as
stuffed teddy bears, dinosaurs, fabric designs, or photos of fabric de-
signs. One court in a teddy bear case noted that analytic dissection is
inappropriate and that Krofft rejected expert analysis of dissimilarities
247. 3 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 13.03[A][l][b] (1989) (citing Chafee, Reflections on the Law
of Copyright, 45 COLUM. L. REV. 503, 513-14 (1945)).
248. Id.
249. See id.
250. Supra text accompanying notes 129-32.
251. Supra note 134.
252. Id. To which one might add Where and Why, completing journalism's traditional pen-
tad.
253. Abramson, Look and Feel of Computer Software, 95 CASE & COMMENT 3 (1990).
254. Apple Computer, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 717 F. Supp. 1428 (N.D. Cal. 1989).
255. Johnson Controls, Inc. v. Phoenix Control Sys., Inc., 886 F.2d 1173 (9th Cir. 1989).
256. 17 U.S.C. § 102("-' (1988).
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and differences among characters in television productions, asking in-
stead whether the defendant has captured the "total look and feel" of
the original work.257 What the courts seem to be doing in these cases is
using pattern analysis with an emphasis on the aural and visual as-
pects of substantial similarity, which the courts have historically ig-
nored in favor of "literary analysis.""25 Thus, in these cases, tables of
similarities become irrelevant; what is important is the overall impres-
sion of the works on the ordinary observer.25 9
The element of "look" may be satisfactory for works such as films
and television programs, where the cumulus of audiovisual expres-
sions is greater than the sum of. their parts, 260 and perhaps also for
teddy bears and stuffed dinosaurs, which can be said to embody a
certain "look." It is doubtful, however, that the "look" of "user in-
terfaces" or computer screens can be the proper focus of an analysis
of substantial similarity when a programmer can easily copy the plain-
tiff's source code program and make it look different from the origi-
nal by making trivial changes and using other tricks. 261 The element of
"feel," moreover, is not appropriate for either stuffed dinosaurs or
computer screens for the same reason it is not appropriate for other
works: as "a wholly amorphous referent, [it] merely invites an abdica-
tion of analysis." 262
Nevertheless, apparently emboldened because the Krofft court re-
lied on an audiovisual analysis more than a literary analysis, 263 some
courts have taken the mildly revolutionary step of emphasizing the vi-
sual aspects of the works in their comparisons. Thus, the courts may
have returned to a notion of "idea" suggestive of the original Greek
meaning but have not yet defined a standard by which to fix the ap-
propriate level of abstraction establishing substantial similarity.
IV. CONCLUSION
One of the two essential elements of a copyright claim is unlawful
copying of a copyrighted work by the defendant. To establish unlaw-
ful copying where the competing works are not identical, the courts
apply the standard of "substantial similarity," which requires the sep-
aration of protected expression from unprotected ideas. Such separa-
257. Spectravest, Inc. v. Mervyn's Inc., 673 F. Supp. 1486 (N.D. Cal. 1987).
258. Berman & Boxer, supra note 148, at 315.
259. See id. at 324.
260. See id.; but see supra notes 117-19 and accompanying text (Even in literary works,
Judge Hand recognized that the synthesis of elements creates "an inseparable unit.").
261. Brinson, supra note 227, at 827.
262. 3 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 13.03[A], at 13-35 (1989).
263. Berman & Boxer, supra note 148, at 323.
19901
250 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITYLAWREVIEW [Vol. 18:221
tion involves the problems of abstraction that have preoccupied
generations of philosophers and legal scholars. As illustrated by the
Tree of Porphyry, the problems of abstraction are difficult to resolve
because no one has been able to state a rule defining the point at
which a category is to be subdivided, in other words, at what level of
abstraction things cease to be similar. Because legal, as well as philo-
sophical principles, seem to come in pairs, dichotomies will always be
a factor in legal analysis, and indeterminate areas of the law will sub-
sist. Judge Hand's admonition that decisions must be ad hoc appears
to be a reasonable assessment of the situation. Decisions, however,
need not be unprincipled; the courts must have a clear sense of the
terms and standards applicable in specific types of cases. They must
also recognize that original works embody many ideas (identified
through analysis) rather than a single Platonic form (intuited through
reflection).
In sum, criticisms directed at the idea-expression distinction deal
more with its application than with the distinction itself. The distinc-
tion, when properly invoked, can adequately balance the competing
interests of copyright law and the first amendment, as well as the in-
ternal conflict of copyright law: promoting the advancement of sci-
ence and the arts through access to the marketplace of ideas, while
rewarding authors and writers for their efforts by granting them, for a
limited time, exclusive rights to their works.
